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Abstract Drawing on a case study conducted in a private residential care home, this article
examines the emotional labour of care workers in relation to the moral
construction of care and the practical experiences of work. An examination of the
company’s discursive attempts to construct, manage and demarcate its employees’
emotional labour was carried out alongside an exploration of the carers’ own
interpretations of, and enrolment in, the care-giving role. The potential economic
and emotional consequences of these occurrences were a key focus of the inquiry.
The study found that carers, encouraged by the company, naturalised their
emotional labour, and that this had contradictory consequences. On the one hand it
justiﬁed the economic devaluation of the carer’s work and left her vulnerable to
emotional over-involvement and client aggression. On the other, it allowed the
worker to defend the moral interests of those within her care and to see when
those interests were in conﬂict with the economic motivations of her employer.
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Since the publication of Hochschild’s work on emotional labour (1979, 1983), there has been
an abundance of research examining the emotional aspects of nursing (Gray 2009, Huynh
et al. 2008, Smith 1992, 2012, Theodosius 2008), midwifery (Hunter 2001, 2004) and care in
nursing homes (Lopez 2006). In this body of literature, nurses’ management of emotion has
often been characterised as a tacit and uncodiﬁed skill that is of potential therapeutic value to
patients and nurses (Foster and Hawkins 2005, Gray 2009, Hunter 2001, Phillips 1996), but
which typically goes unrecognised and undervalued in healthcare settings (Hunter and Smith
2007, McCreight 2005, Smith and Gray 2000). The invisible character of emotional labour
also makes it particularly vulnerable to displacement by new technology (Foster and Hawkins
2005, Rankin 2009), the rationalisation of work (Bone 2002) and a process of professionalisa-
tion that has progressively medicalised nursing and, in turn, transferred non-technical, emo-
tional tasks to those lower down the workplace hierarchy (Apesoa-Varano 2007, Herdman
2004, Smith 2012). It is in response to these processes of professionalisation, medicalisation
and technicisation that researchers have called for an increased explication and codiﬁcation of
the emotional labour entailed in nursing so that it might be reconceptualised and valued as a
skill (Gray 2009). Here, the clinical setting in which the nurse carries out her labour; with its
high level of professional accountability, rigid structural and regulatory control and increasing
technological and medical specialisation, is presented as antithetical to the caring disposition
traditionally expected of nurses.
The recognition of the importance of emotional labour in the workplace is not unproblemat-
ic, however, for as Hochschild originally observed, it can lead both to feelings of emotional
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fraudulence and, at the other extreme, the mismeasurement of emotional labour as a natural
disposition with its own intrinsic rewards. To examine this further, a case study was under-
taken in a private residential home for the elderly; a relatively non-technological, non-medi-
cally mediated and non-professionalised space, where one would expect emotional labour to
be a central component of the care worker’s role. The aim was to explore the extent to which
emotions were deliberately put to work in this environment and to consider whether the use of
emotion was unambiguously positive for the care workers. The study did indeed ﬁnd that,
unlike nurses in clinical settings, the care workers were actively encouraged by the employer
to manage their emotions and that the consequences of this were complex and contradictory.
Review of the literature
Deﬁning emotional labour
Hochschild’s (1983) pioneering study of ﬂight attendants reﬂects on the manner in which an
individual can actively cultivate and manage emotion, not simply for the purposes of emo-
tional display but also with the aim of bringing one’s genuine emotions into line with a soci-
ety’s ‘feeling rules’ – its moral script towards feeling (1983: 56). Here, Hochschild outlines
two ways in which we may act: surface acting and deep acting. The former refers to how we
outwardly appear to others. In the latter, our display is a product of our work on feeling; it
reﬂects a real feeling that has been self-induced (1983: 35).
Hochschild’s research led her to express concern about the emotional costs for workers
when these, formerly private, acts of emotion management come to be bought and sold as a
form of labour (emotional labour) and, in turn, instrumentalised and standardised by company-
prescribed feeling rules and rules of display (1983: 55, 186). Hochschild’s focus was on the
manner in which the commercialisation of emotional exchanges has subordinated a private
emotional system to commercial logic and, in doing so, has transformed it, eliminating the
worker’s right to command what is given in social interaction and to whom (1983: 119, 186).
For Hochschild, when a proﬁt motive is placed beneath these aspects of emotional life they
are transmuted and it becomes necessary for the worker to relinquish control over how her
work is to be carried out, leaving her role deskilled and devalued (Hochschild 1983: 119).
Hochschild’s recognition that individuals might be expected to manage their emotional
performances in line with an employer’s expectations – and her subsequent coining of the term
emotional labour – allowed for a proliferation of research on emotion in the workplace. Hochs-
child’s concept of emotion management is particularly amenable to research on the healthcare
professions, not least because producing ‘the sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe
place’ (Hochschild 1983: 7) has been considered a fundamental element of patient care (Bolton
2000, 2001, Bone 2002, Hunter 2001, 2004, James 1992, Smith 2012, Theodosius 2008). A
common assumption in the healthcare literature is that the quality of nursing care is, in part,
achieved by means of nurses’ emotional commitment to those in their care (Huynh, Alderson,
and Thompson 2008). Likewise, both patients’ complaints and wider public concern over poor
quality care have been framed as a response to a lack of emotional sensitivity on the part of
healthcare professionals (Fletcher 2000, Strauss et al. 1982).
Researchers have commented upon the invisible nature of emotion work in nursing which
leaves such work poorly acknowledged and, in turn, undervalued both in medical organisations
(Hunter and Smith 2007) and by nurses themselves (McCreight 2005). Emotions have been
presented as being in contention with the dominant technical-rational paradigm in healthcare
settings and thus as in danger of being pushed aside in favour of the more physical and techni-
cal aspects of care (Hunter 2001). By conceptualising emotion as a freely given element of
© 2015 The Authors
Sociology of Health & Illness © 2015 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The moral labour of care workers 113
nursing work that is regulated by the emotional labourer herself, those researching the nursing
professions have tended to conceptualise emotional labour as a positive thing which must be
protected and left untouched (McClure and Murphy 2007). The result has been an idealising
of the emotional elements of caregiving over and above the technical and medical aspects of
nursing work, and a neglect of Hochschild’s original distinction between emotion work and
emotional labour and, with it, her critical insights into the commodiﬁcation of the emotions.
Moral reasoning
In order to assess the emotional labour of care workers in a more critical fashion, the research
draws upon Ralph Fevre’s work (2000, 2003, Fevre et al. 2003), which places Hochschild’s
discussion of the commodiﬁcation of emotion within the broader context of demoralisation,
where economic rationality has come to undermine genuine morality.
For Fevre (2000: 142), society has four distinct sense-making ﬁelds at its disposal, each of
which uses a discrete combination of ontology and epistemology. In western societies the
forms of sense-making arising in each of the four categories with which we are most familiar
are science, common sense, religion and sentiment (Fevre 2000: 141). The ﬁeld of sense-mak-
ing drawn upon in each instance rests upon the manner in which the knowledge and belief
systems surrounding it have been socially constructed (Fevre, Chaney, and Stephens 2003: 4).
Both social institutions and individual actors thus have a role in the formation of sense, and
each is prone to making a mistake in identifying which sense-making ﬁeld is appropriate in
given situations – to making what Fevre terms a ‘category mistake’ (2000: 154).
Fevre’s account of demoralisation predominantly focuses on two forms of sense-making:
sentiment and common sense. He deﬁnes sentiment as a form of interpreting reality that
makes a consideration of human feelings (a consideration that rests not on knowledge but on
belief) central to the formation of the behavioural guidelines that are usually described as mor-
als (Fevre, Chaney, and Stephens 2003: 3). Conversely, when we draw upon common sense,
our reasoning promotes sensations over feelings; our actions are guided by the knowledge
yielded by human experience, on the ‘proof’ provided to us by our senses, rather than on
belief. ‘We do not have to believe in our senses to sense, but we do have to believe in our
feelings to feel’ (Fevre 2003: 73). As knowledge has expanded at the cost of belief, Fevre
argues, common sense has spread into areas of life where sentiment is critical to the suste-
nance of moral reasoning, feelings being the chief casualty of the process of demoralisation.
Fevre suggests that demoralisation also results from sentiment being demanded in the service
of (common sense) economic reasoning, as when emotional labourers mistakenly moralise
transactions that are fundamentally regulated by common sense calculations and instrumental
self-interest.
Fevre uses his concept of sentiment to suggest that Hochschild’s (1983: 18) discussion of
emotional interactions as gift exchanges guided by feeling rules points towards standards
which arise from a morality. For Fevre (2003: 76–7), what is missing from Hochschild’s
account is the clariﬁcation that the corporate feeling rules she examined were being used to
substitute for moral rules. It is in this sense that Hochschild’s (1983: 186) suggestion that a
proﬁt motive has been slipped in under acts of emotion management can be understood as a
category mistake which acts to persuade employees that the commercial transaction in which
they are engaged is one in which moral rules of behaviour apply – one which must be inter-
preted in terms of sentiment (2003: 78). Fevre’s proposition is that Hochschild’s research is
essentially a documentation of the creation of an ‘ersatz morality’ in the airline industry, which
was able to serve in the place of the genuine morality that had been torn down, in part, by
common sense reasoning (2003: 83). The emotional dissonance which Hochschild identiﬁed in
her ﬂight attendants, whereby workers felt a sense of estrangement between self and feeling,
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can thus be re-characterised as moral dissonance – as a symptom of demoralisation (Fevre
2003: 81).
Research questions
If the emotional labour of the ﬂight attendant is an ersatz morality, then this may well be
because her work entails a commercial transaction where the crew’s personal services are more
a matter of added value than a core element of the business. But what of the case where the
client is less a customer and more a person with a need for care? Does sentiment have a more
legitimate role to play in care work than in the work of ﬂight attendants? Can care workers
avoid the moral dissonances referred to above and enjoy a properly recognised and valued
commitment to emotional labour? This research set out to answer these questions.
Methods
Research setting
The ﬁndings draw upon a case study carried out in a private residential home, located in the
south of England, which I am calling Oakwood. Founded in the 1980s, Oakwood forms part
of an international, publicly traded company that operates at the high-end of the social care
market. Oakwood was initially chosen because it offered the greatest opportunity to learn,
because of my ability to gain access to it as a past employee. Further, unlike residential
homes at the lower end of the care home market, the training of new employees and day-to-
day practices at Oakwood were known to revolve heavily around a managerial discourse of
‘the good worker’. The company’s explicit promotion of emotional labour allowed it to be
examined as a means to gain further insight into this issue. Methodological choices were thus
made with the intention of both reﬁning and supplementing previous theoretical arguments,
illustrating if, how and in what manner those concerns identiﬁed in the literature were mani-
fest in the case. Access to the site was negotiated with the managing director of the residential
home.
Research design
Data collection was carried out between June and September 2012. The ﬁrst stage of the
research involved the analysis of a corpus of documents that was purposively selected in order,
ﬁrstly, to examine the external impression which the company intended to give of itself and its
workers and, secondly, to examine the manner in which it deﬁned and constructed carers’
emotional labour. The document analysis thus comprised two parts. Firstly, publically available
documents such as the company’s website, newspaper advertisements and brochures given to
prospective clients were examined. Secondly, carers’ job speciﬁcations and training manuals,
as well as Oakwood’s company handbook, which was given to all new employees, were
examined.
The resulting ﬁndings were used to guide the subsequent stage of research: participant
observation. These observations focused on the company’s week-long induction training of
new employees, which was carried out by a regional trainer. I adopted the role of a new
recruit, though both the regional trainer and the new recruits were made aware that I was car-
rying out the research. Each new recruit provided informed consent prior to the observations
being undertaken and several agreed to be interviewed following the training. The observations
were conducted with the intention of examining the feeling rules that the company attached to
the care-giving role, the techniques it used to encourage the carers to carry out their emotional
labour and the extent to which this involved a form of ersatz morality.
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Following the observations, semi-structured interviews were conducted with six new recruits
who had attended the training, ﬁve of whom were women. The principal themes of these inter-
views were: the participants’ motivations for becoming carers, their ﬁrst impressions of their
employer and their thoughts about Oakwood’s service principles, and the role of feelings and
the performance of feelings. Interviews were subsequently undertaken with six care workers
who had worked at Oakwood for over 12 months, ﬁve of whom were women. The key themes
of these interviews were whether their initial feelings about their work had changed, how they
deﬁned doing a good job, their experiences of working for the company, their interpretations
of its service principles, and the challenges and dilemmas that could arise at work.
Data analysis
Each interview was transcribed, alongside any related ﬁeld notes, and a summary of each
carer’s account was written down in order to avoid the decontextualisation and fragmentation
of the respondents’ narratives. The transcripts, observation notes and key extracts of text from
the document analyses were uploaded to NVivo and coded thematically. An adaptive approach
was employed. Here, data was analysed both deductively, in terms of considering if those con-
cerns previously identiﬁed in the literature arose within the data, and inductively, whereby
interpretations of the data were used to rework and augment the existing theoretical framework
(Layder 1998). Each code denoted a key theme, which will now be discussed.
Findings
The naturalisation of emotional labour
In a handbook given to new employees, Oakwood stressed that those whom it chose to
employ were ‘truly unique’ in that they held the belief that ‘real happiness and joy come from
serving others’; they had a ‘natural serving heart’ and were ‘born to care’. Likewise, several
respondents described this altruistic disposition as an integral part of their nature, not just a
marketable skill but something which they were used to acting upon in private settings. For
example, Irena, a new recruit said ‘if you ask my family “what are my qualities?” then they
say I’m very caring and very loving and nurturing. I think I have it naturally within me’.
Equally, Miranda noted:
I believe that I should help those who are weaker than me. I think that unless you believe
in those things it will be difﬁcult to acquire them whilst you’re working … It’s like some-
thing that shines. It’s who you are.
Both Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002: 76) and Payne (2009: 349) have suggested that the
construction of workers’ care activities as something that requires what are frequently deemed
to be ‘natural’ feminine qualities (such as nurturing and empathy), causes the skill content of
such work to go unnoticed and poorly rewarded, as the labour that those activities entail is
effectively erased. This was clear when Jane, an experienced carer, said ‘I personally feel that
what I do is natural, I don’t have to try’.
Despite receiving an extremely low income in comparison to other full-time workers (the
weekly earnings of a care worker working 35 hours a week at Oakwood were £234 while the
national median was £506 [ONS 2011]) – just one respondent, Rachel, an experienced carer,
felt that her wage was unreasonable. Furthermore, when interpreting the appropriateness of
their wages, the carers seemed to place added value on the technical and learnt, as opposed to
emotional, aspects of their work. Rachel, for example, felt that £7 an hour was a reasonable
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wage for those ‘doing basic care like talking to people and helping get them up’, as these
activities did not constitute ‘doing more than average’ and certainly involved ‘much less than
doing meds’, which required training. Likewise, of the 11 respondents who felt that their wage
was reasonable, three said that they would expect a higher salary if they held care-related qual-
iﬁcations and four mentioned that training as a medical technician would lead them to expect
higher wages. It appeared that, because the carers had naturalised a key aspect of their role –
emotional labour – they undervalued their work and felt that, without emphasising the techni-
cal and learnt aspects of their role, they would have weak grounds for expecting higher wages.
This replicates the perspective of nurses interviewed by Gray (2009) who viewed the model of
the natural, female carer as a barrier to the establishment of nursing as a profession. The con-
sequence, as Smith (2012: 188) observes, is a hierarchy of values between personal care activi-
ties and technical skills in nursing, whereby personal care activities are frequently demoted
down the occupational ladder. Smith (2012) warns that this hierarchy is illustrative of Hochs-
child’s (2003: 221) contention that the ‘cold modern ideal’ of providing the most practical,
efﬁcient and rational means of care will prevail if the emotional aspects of care continue to be
undervalued and under-rewarded.
Motivations to care: altruism as a resource
At Oakwood, however, rather than portraying emotion as a weakness (Gray 2009) to employ-
ees, the company implied that workers who acted upon their ‘natural’, altruistic motivations
would ﬁnd their work rewarding in its own right. For example, the company handbook prom-
ises employees that ‘the best beneﬁt of working at Oakwood is the feeling that you are making
a difference in so many lives’. Five of the six new recruits described their motivations to
become carers in terms of how the role would allow them to express their philanthropic nature
and realise their true self. Wendy, for example, who had previously cared for her mother, sta-
ted: ‘I need to pass that care I have on to somebody else’ and suggested that care-work would
allow her to do this, providing ‘that double whammy. . . a career and job satisfaction as well’.
Miranda noted ‘I believe that I should help those who are weaker than me. . . so I would actu-
ally prefer to do this work if I can, because I know that it will give me more satisfaction’.
Likewise, ﬁve of the experienced carers described the ‘fulﬁlment’ and ‘satisfaction’ that they
felt when ‘going home exhausted’ (Julie) or when leaving residents ‘happy, smiling [and] reas-
sured’ (Jane). It was clear that most of the new recruits and experienced carers took a voca-
tional, as opposed to instrumental, attitude towards their employment.
Folbre (2002) and England (2005) have argued that if workers consider the intrinsic proper-
ties of their work as an amenity for themselves (in this case, if they ﬁnd satisfaction in caring
for people) then this makes them more prepared to accept a lower wage. The manner in which
Oakwood made use of its recruits’ altruistic motivations was particularly apparent when the
company discussed employee beneﬁts, which included ‘hugs from the residents’ and ‘“thank-
yous” from their families’. By deﬁning the carers’ work not only as natural but as naturally
remunerated in the same moral currency of hugs and thank-yous (in what Oakwood’s CEO
unashamedly refers to as a ‘second paycheque’ in a video shown to new recruits) the company
further undermined its employees’ capacity to dispute their pay packets by causing them to
evaluate their work in terms of sentiment. The experienced carers certainly appraised their
day-to-day work performance in terms of whether they had been able to gain a sense of per-
sonal worth and moral value from their clients or their clients’ families. When asked to
describe an instance where she felt that she had done a ‘good job’, Jess said ‘the family were
really grateful, they really appreciated it. . . it made you feel like you’re really doing something
worthwhile’. Rachel also noted that ‘you get more out of your day if you push yourself to be
positive and make that person happy’. Rachel’s strategy to being positive at work was to put
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herself ‘in the family’s position … so that you kind of forget about yourself’. Encouraged by
the company, carers at Oakwood identiﬁed their work as something that they genuinely
enjoyed and, in turn, found themselves actively participating in reducing the value and visibil-
ity of their labour.
This runs counter to Theodosius’ observation that the quasi-marketisation and privatisation
of health care in the UK has challenged:
The belief that the nurse is caring because she is expressing something that is intrinsic to
her fundamental character, freely offering care to her patient in exchange for gratitude and
personal satisfaction. (2008: 39)
At Oakwood, this feeling rule, which works on the assumption that ‘emotional labour is
representative of [carers’] desire to care and is something that is … freely given’ (Theodosius
2008: 37) was not challenged or undermined but actively encouraged.
Deep acting: the management of feeling rules
Theodosius’ research on the emotional labour of nurses also proposes that, when the relation-
ship between nurse and patient is commercialised, there is a loss of ‘the signiﬁcance of feeling
rules that mediate issues of intimacy between nurses and patients by imitating personal and
private relationships’ (2008: 39). For Theodosius, this causes nurses to adopt a more cynical
view of their emotional labour and results in the substitution of deep acting with surface act-
ing. At Oakwood, however, training hand-outs strongly encouraged recruits to behave towards
residents ‘as if’ they were family or close friends, stating that they must ‘develop a genuinely
close relationship with the resident’ ensuring that the home would feel like:
A safe, loving place where the resident would be among friends … [and] where residents
and staff can curl up on the sofa together to share laughter as well as tears.
For Hochschild (1983: 7) the induction and suppression of feelings required to produce ‘the
sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place’ often draws upon a source of self that
we honour as deeply integral to our personality. In the case of Oakwood, the company not
only marketed the convivial nature of its employees to potential clients, it depicted the client–
carer relationship as entailing a deep, authentic, emotional bond. In consequence, when asked
whether their level of commitment had changed since ﬁrst being employed at Oakwood, all
the experienced carers said that their level of commitment had increased and each attributed
this to the personal bonds that they had formed with residents. These ﬁndings run counter to
the suggestion that the commercialisation of health care has led healthcare workers to adopt a
more cynical attitude towards their emotional performances (Theodosius 2008: 39), partaking
in only surface acting as a means to disguise the mechanistic and un-individualised nature of
hospital care (Herdman 2004, Wigens 1997). In fact, Oakwood’s corporate strategy, by estab-
lishing feeling rules that encouraged the imitation of familial care-giving, acted to augment the
carer’s sincere adoption of the care-giving role.
When the carers were encouraged to treat the residents as if they were family, the company
was, in Hochschild’s terms, advocating the speciﬁc imaginings that they might draw upon in
their interactions with the residents (1983: 49). Hochschild warned that one consequence of
such recommendations is a commercial colonisation of imaginative resources, the effect of
which may be confusion between self and role (and, in this case, a nagging disquiet about
who exactly one’s family really are). What was most noticeable here, however, was how the
company’s emotional overtures acted to persuade its workers to over-identify with the
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care-giving role at the expense of upholding their political and economic entitlements as work-
ers. By encouraging the carer to apply sentiment to her work (by causing her to identify it as
natural), Oakwood invited her to make what Fevre (2000: 154) would term a category mistake.
The carers’ satisfaction with their wages implies that they had made this category mistake and,
in consequence, struggled to give up their care-giving role in favour of adopting an ‘uncaring’,
dispassionate, common sense relationship with their employers that would be a pre-requisite
for expressing their economic entitlements as workers.
Voluntarism
The experienced carers’ tendency to evaluate their work in moral, as opposed to economic,
terms was clear in their accounts of when they had done a good job. Here, by evaluating their
work in terms of the moral currency of emotion, the carers had a tendency to give of them-
selves voluntarily. Pierre, for example, noted that he appraised his work in accordance with
the company’s feeling rules by thinking to himself ‘this is my parent or my relative’. For
Pierre, this meant that doing a good job inevitably entailed ‘doing more than what you’re told
to do’ or ‘being able to stay after work’. Likewise, Sarah referred to an occasion where ‘I
came in, in my own time. I didn’t get paid for it. . . and she [the resident] was really thankful
for it and that made me happy’.
These acts align with what Bolton and Boyd (2003: 293) would term ‘philanthropic emotion
management’, which refers to workers’ activities that are motivated by a choice to surpass or-
ganisational prescriptions, displaying additional emotion to what a company requires in the
form of a gift. In their critique of Hochschild, Bolton and Boyd use this term to help demon-
strate how emotional displays in the workplace do not emerge from only one kind of emotion
management – that governed by a company’s proﬁt motive (2003: 296). Bolton’s (2000, 2001)
own research has outlined instances of such autonomous, ‘authentic’ emotion management in
the nursing professions. She presents this gift of emotion work as something that is becoming
increasingly difﬁcult to offer in marketised healthcare services (2000). What was clear in the
case of my respondents, however, was that, while these acts of emotion management were vol-
untary, the social feeling rules on which they drew had come under the sway of the company.
For example, in the quotes above, though both Sarah and Pierre described instances where
they had provided care beyond that speciﬁed in their contracts, they evaluated that care in
terms of Oakwood’s prescribed feeling rules which deﬁned good care as ‘family-like’ and as
intrinsically, as opposed to ﬁnancially rewarding work.
Like Hochschild, Gorz (1989) argues that there is a fundamental transformation of the
meaning of certain activities when they are subjected to commercial logic. For Gorz, a carer
must not have a vested interest in people requiring her to care; her job is done well only when
it is performed out of a sense of vocation; an unconditional desire to help others (1989: 144).
That there is economic demand, and therefore remuneration, for the care that she offers should
not be the carer’s basic motivation; money simply enables her to fulﬁl her vocation. There is
therefore, in Gorz’s view, always an element of care that takes the form of a gift, whereby the
receiver of care receives something from the carer which is beyond that which is, or can be,
remunerated (1989: 144).
When the company becomes overly prescriptive in deﬁning the carer’s work – when it
excessively manages the feeling rules to which she must refer – two possible consequences
arise. One is that the gift is withdrawn, the quality of care atrophies and interpersonal labour
degenerates into ‘soulless conviviality’ (Gorz 1989: 145) much like that characteristic of
Hochschild’s ‘cold modern solution’ (2003: 221). The other is that the carer continues to give
– she continues to care – but in a commercial context that makes that care servile and poten-
tially humiliating. In those activities where the very gift of oneself becomes the subject of the
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commercial exchange: when, in this case, the company attempts to teach, purchase and man-
age the act of giving; this gift is necessarily devalued or distorted. There is, Gorz argues:
An inalienable dimension of our existence, the enjoyment of which we cannot sell to anyone
without giving of ourselves into the bargain, and the sale of which devalues the act of
giving without relieving us of the obligation to perform it as a gift. (1989: 149).
Oakwood seemed to understand that it could successfully manage, commercialise and cheapen
the provision of care without destroying the workers’ obligation to perform it as a gift.
Maintaining a smile: surface acting
Also key to Oakwood’s managerial philosophy were its service principles, which were
displayed ubiquitously in the company’s advertising and in training hand-outs. They were
deﬁned as Oakwood’s hallmark, which functioned to guide employees in all their work inter-
actions. The company’s induction training made several calls for surface and deep acting
which drew upon the normative framework established by these principles. One such call for
surface acting was the need to maintain a smile. When discussing the principle of ‘joy in ser-
vice’, Peter, the trainer, said ‘people want to come in and see happy staff … You walk
through the door and BOOM, it’s Oakwood … I’m an actor’. The need to maintain a smile at
work was the topic of much discussion in the interviews with new recruits, who all stated that
being positive at work was important.
The new recruits recognised that this kind of performance might not reﬂect their immediate
feelings. For example, Wendy described herself as ‘a ﬁrm believer that you hide behind your
smile’ and Josie said ‘as soon as you walk in … if you’ve got problems you put a front on …
It’s important that you try and do that’. Inadvertently employing Goffman’s terminology, Josie
referred to smiling at work as a ‘front’ that should be assumed upon entering the workplace,
what would be her front-stage. Although in Goffman’s (1959: 28–32) terms her attitude could
be categorised as cynical, Josie’s willingness to play this role combined egocentric motivations
with a deeper and more compelling moral inﬂection. Though conceding that not being ‘outgo-
ing’ and not ‘putting on a smile’ at work might ‘get her into trouble’, Josie also understood
the need for surface acting in terms of her deep emotional beliefs, which she saw as ‘part of
being caring’, describing the display of negative emotions to the residents as ‘wrong’.
All the experienced carers also linked being a good carer with adopting an insincere display
of positivity – to being an actor, as Peter recommended. For example, Rachel stated ‘you leave
your problems at the door … if you come in miserable then you’re in the wrong job … that’s
what we’re about’. Jane, when asked what she thought about the need to maintain a smile, said:
I think it’s brilliant because I’m a smiley, caring person anyway … if you smile at them, if
you’re genuinely happy, even if you’re not really happy, if you’ve got a smile for the resi-
dents then it lifts their spirits.
Jess, similarly, when asked if it was always possible to be positive at work, said ‘I think it
comes naturally to me I mean … you should act like you’re always happy … because it
makes the residents more happier’.
This diverges from the experiences of Goffman’s medical students, who were required to
drop their idealistic orientations to their work upon commencing medical school, laying aside
their holy aspirations of showing concern for people with diseases (1959: 31). Instead, the
carers’ motivations and aspirations were put to use by the company, with carers regarding their
adherence to the company’s prescriptions for surface and deep acting as the realisation of these
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motivations. Thus, while acknowledging that being positive at work would entail the mainte-
nance of a front – surface acting – the carers sincerely deﬁned the assumption of this front as
a reﬂection of self; an offshoot of their ready-made capacity to care. This kind of surface act-
ing is different from the cynical performances of service workers described by Goffman who
are ‘sometimes forced to delude their customers because their customers show such a heartfelt
demand for it’ (1959: 29). Instead, it is the care workers who have the ‘heartfelt demand’ –
their surface performance is in the service of a deeper conviction – a deep feeling rule – about
the moral importance of care. The surface acting of the carers thus departed from Hochschild’s
(1983: 36–7) deﬁnition of the phenomena as an affective display which is put on, where the
actress is ‘acting as if she had a feeling’. Rather than leaving a separate, cynical self intact,
the carers’ surface displays were a product of their sincere commitment to their caring role,
which the carers took on as a component of self. Some of the implications of this sincere com-
mitment will now be explored.
Carer vulnerability
In Hochschild’s (1983) analysis of ﬂight attendants, acting in the interest of the client often
meant tolerating objectionable behaviour, so the rules of moral conduct were unequally loaded
in favour of the customer. Like the client–worker relationship in Hochschild’s study, the
carer–resident relationship is one-way: it requires that the carer gives of herself without expect-
ing anything from the resident in return. This one-way personalisation was apparent in several
of the feeling rules that the company prescribed to the carers, including the need to be positive
and smile at work.
In the context of the residential home, the dependency of the clients on the carers makes
objectionable behaviour of the ‘demanding customer’ type, as was experienced by Hochs-
child’s ﬂight attendants, a less common occurrence. Nonetheless, the carers did report dealing
with challenging behaviour on a regular basis. In the induction training at Oakwood, Peter did
little to deﬁne what client behaviour might be unacceptable, justifying the need for emotional
labour not in terms of the residents’ payment for a service but in terms of their impaired men-
tal capacity, physical vulnerability and his assumption that ‘you can’t treat an old dog new
tricks’. In the training, any discussions about interactions that might upset, anger or harm the
carers emphasised how the carers should manage their own emotions rather than the behaviour
of the residents.
Although caring for vulnerable people is very distinct from the stewarding of airline clients
examined in Hochschild’s work, there is a danger that the one-way nature of the carer–client
relationship can be extended or taken advantage of. In the case of Oakwood, the vulnerability
of the clients was, quite rightly, considered as a legitimate basis for the carers to manage their
own emotional displays. It was when these one-way rules of moral conduct were extended to
those occurrences where the residents verbally or physically mistreated the carers, however,
that the latter were placed in a potentially vulnerable position. For example, Jane, an experi-
enced carer, mentioned a client’s aggressive behaviour:
She was obviously having a distressing moment for her and she screamed at me and called
me a fat bitch. But umm [laughs] … I think you have to try not to let it affect you, I mean
they’ve got memory problems so they probably don’t realise what they’re doing … as long
as you keep smiling! [Laughs].
Likewise, other carers referred to residents who ‘shout at you all the time’, who were ‘quite
forceful with you’ (Rachel), and instances where residents had ‘lashed out’ and ‘kicked them’
(Pierre). In accordance with Luck et al.’s (2008) study on nurses’ ascription of meanings to
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their patients’ acts of violence, it was clear that the carers at Oakwood condoned the ill-treat-
ment that they were subjected to in terms of ‘mitigating factors’ such as the residents’ reduced
responsibility. Though the carers admitted that it was sometimes challenging to care for certain
residents, the fact that those residents ‘might have dementia’ or ‘suffer from confusion’ meant
that the carers’ response was to ‘just get on with it’ and ‘deal with it yourself’ (Rachel), to
‘learn to try and deal with things’ and ‘let things go over your head’ (Jess), or to ‘try and
ignore it’ (Pierre). For Luck et al. (2008: 1076), while ascribing these meanings to clients’
violent behaviour allows the worker to remain calm, tolerant and sympathetic towards the cli-
ent, the long-term consequence is that such events go under-reported and under-recorded. This,
in turn, makes it harder to challenge one-sided training protocols and to expose the failure of
companies like Oakwood to address the deeper roots of resident misbehaviour, such as deﬁ-
ciencies in care caused by short-stafﬁng.
Emotional distress
Just one experienced carer, Jane, said that, despite believing that her emotional obligations to
the residents were the same as those that she had towards her family, she was able to ‘go out
of the staff door at night and forget about it’. The ﬁve other experienced carers described the
complex emotional costs of their difﬁculty to detach themselves from the care-giving role that
they identiﬁed as a component of self. These carers not only performed their role as if the resi-
dents were close friends or family members; they considered their relationship with certain
residents to be wholly personal and authentic. In consequence, they formed deep emotional
attachments to the residents. When asked if she felt that she needed to be emotionally involved
in her work to do it well, Sarah said:
At the end of the day, if you don’t feel emotional you don’t care, and then you’re not a
carer. It’s like when residents die and you get some people who are like ‘Oh you’ll get used
to it’ and I think ‘Well … I’m showing my emotion because I care’ … you do get emotion-
ally attached to everyone.
Several other carers agreed that ‘if you weren’t emotionally involved then you wouldn’t be
very caring’ (Jess), and that ‘you’ve got to show some kind of emotional attachment to
everyone to be able to care properly’ (Rachel); which made Rachel ‘get upset to see them
upset’ and resulted in her ‘going home and worrying about the residents’. The carers’ sincere
commitment to the care-giving role – their unreserved application of sentiment – left them at
risk of becoming over-involved in their work. The result was that the carers became emo-
tionally distressed when the residents suffered or died. For example, likening the emotional
obligations that she felt towards residents to those that she felt towards her family, Sarah
said:
When Pearl died I cried all day non-stop like it was my granddad. I came home and I cried,
I cried before she died, seeing her crying, going home crying. That felt like it was a family
member … sometimes I’ve really, really, really, really, really cried for a resident.
Like Hochschild’s ﬂight attendants, identifying so sincerely with their clients left the carers at
Oakwood at risk of becoming emotionally exhausted; of being unable to estrange the self from
the care-giving role, which the company constructed as familial (1983: 132). Nonetheless, the
carers recognised that it was not possible to retain the same level of emotional involvement
with all residents, which perhaps prevented them from entering the state of emotional
numbness described by Hochschild (1983: 188).
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Moral advocates: being critical of the company
Of the six experienced carers, those who appeared to most personalise their relationships with
the residents (Sarah, Rachel and Jess) were also more likely to express scepticism over the
moral integrity of the company. The sincerity with which they undertook their caring role; the
heartfelt use of sentiment which they brought to it, was, ironically, what seemed to have led
them to adopt a more critical attitude towards the corporate strategy of Oakwood. This criti-
cism was particularly apparent when the experienced carers discussed the company’s service
principles. For example, Jess said:
It feels like you’re on your own in trying to care for the residents really. And you try and
express your word to the management but they don’t really understand. They say all that
stuff about respect and that … but they’re just worried about the money and you’re trying
to care for these residents and you can’t give them the right care and it’s like … it’s bat-
tling.
Other examples that carers gave of instances where they felt that Oakwood had gone against
its own service principles included encouraging carers ‘to get residents up quickly’ (Sarah);
being unable to carry out all a resident’s wishes (Jess); and cutting down the amount of time
that carers were allowed to spend with residents (Rachel). These problems, which left the ca-
rers ‘feeling bad’ (Jess) ‘in a difﬁcult position’ and ‘feel[ing] quite rubbish about what you
do’ due to ‘letting down’ residents and their families (Rachel), were attributed to the inade-
quate stafﬁng levels at Oakwood. The effect of ‘being short staffed’ on the ability of the carers
to fulﬁl the caring role was an issue raised by all the experienced carers. This was brieﬂy
touched upon by Peter, the trainer, during the induction: ‘It’s a cost balance’, he said. ‘You as
care workers would want more staff all the time but it’s about doing your job to the best of
your ability’.
Ersatz morality
It appeared that the carers’ unreserved application of sentiment to their work, although being
in one sense a category mistake that made them vulnerable to economic exploitation, was also
what allowed them to feel a sense of moral righteousness in defending the moral interests of
the residents against the commercial interests of their employer. By sincerely identifying their
caring role as an aspect of their character that was resistant to social control, the carers felt jus-
tiﬁed, in the interviews at least, in criticising their employer, albeit by acting as moral advo-
cates for the residents.
This is distinct from the workers discussed by Fevre (2003: 92) who opposed managerial
legitimacy by turning ersatz moralities against managers as a tactic to expose or subvert their
probable intentions. While the workers’ sceptical attitude towards the company did make use
of the ersatz morality fostered by Oakwood, they did so not only as a means of revealing Oak-
wood’s commercial goals, but also in the name of a more authentic morality. The carers’ criti-
cisms of the company called for the replacement of the managers’ common sense reasoning
with sentiment – they were effectively asking their employers to take a properly moral stance
towards the residents. In this sense, the internalised service principles and related feeling rules
had been turned around against the company – in thought if not in deed.
The irony in this situation was that, by making the residents the sole subjects of their moral
concern, the carers had effectively suppressed their own moral interests, even refusing to com-
plain about their own ill-treatment at the hands of difﬁcult residents. Furthermore, as the ca-
rers’ altruistic reasoning had caused them to disregard their economic interests, they also stood
in danger of inviting the company to address their concerns by shifting the burden of care
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back to the already overworked carers – that is, by urging them to work harder in order to
ensure that their virtuous aspirations of providing good quality care were realised.
Conclusion
The starting point for this study was the concern that care-giving in healthcare settings is at
risk of being shorn of its emotional elements, which are difﬁcult to cost and measure (Smith
2012: 186–7). The study found that, in accordance with previous research on the emotional
labour of healthcare workers (Smith 2012, Theodosius 2008), the company in question under-
valued and inadequately rewarded its employees’ emotional labour, but that this did not result
in the withdrawal of emotional labour or sentiment: the care workers continued to offer the gift
of care (Gorz 1989). Fevre’s work (2000, 2003) may offer an explanation as to why emotional
labour, in this residential home at least, has endured despite its lack of ﬁnancial recognition.
Here, encouraged by the company’s ersatz morality, the carers’ naturalised their emotional
labour and continued to act with sentiment. Although this led them to devalue their own inter-
ests as employees, it did provide them with a moral language to defend the interests of the res-
idents and recognise when they were at variance with those of the employer. In effect, the
ersatz morality of the company had become, for them, a genuine morality – albeit one that
made them vulnerable to greater economic exploitation. Here, perhaps, is the unresolvable con-
tradiction of care work in a capitalist society, which is that one cannot care well without the
use of sentiment, but one cannot be paid well without the use of common sense.
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